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Economic emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India has 
fundamentally altered the economic landscape of Asia and its relation to the global 
economy. Using the new dynamic global model, we present forecasts for Asian 
expansion over 2025. These baseline growth forecasts elucidate shifting patterns of 
regional specialization and their consequences for growth and structural change in the 
Asian economies. The central role of trade is examined through analysis of a variety of 
hypothetical global and regional trade agreements. Our results indicate that trade within 
the Asian region is far from reaching its potential, and policies that facilitate integration 
and more efficient regional trade can accelerate growth, especially for lower-income 
Asia. A deeper and more inclusive Asian free trade area can achieve for its members 
large benefits. As an emerging growth bridge between the PRC and India, ASEAN 
economies have the most to gain from Asian economic integration.  
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1 Introduction 
Economic emergence of the world’s two most populous countries is transforming the 
economic landscape of East and South Asia and contributing to fundamental shifts in 
global economic relations. While Asia’s traditional trade with the Western OECD 
continues to expand and intensify, intra-Asian trade is accelerating as the most dynamic 
economies provide growth leverage to their neighbours. This trend is being facilitated 
by official efforts to liberalize trade and private agency that propagates growth linkages 
over regional supply networks. Intensified Asian regional integration has the potential to 
raise incomes among a majority of the world’s poor, yet policy makers lack visibility 
about how trade patterns and domestic adjustments will evolve in the medium and long 
term.  
Using the new Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) VI database with a dynamic 
global model, we present forecasts for Asian expansion over the next decade.1 These 
baseline growth forecasts elucidate shifting patterns of regional specialization and their 
consequences for domestic growth and structural change in the Asian economies. 
Regional differences in growth rates are then analyzed in terms of their fundamental 
determinants. In our examination of the central role of trade in regional growth, we 
provide detailed analysis of the impacts of a variety of hypothetical global and regional 
and global trade agreements.  
Generally speaking, our results indicate that the sustainable growth potential of the 
region remains great, but policies facilitating both integration and adjustment will be 
needed to fulfill this potential. This is particularly the case with regard to poverty 
alleviation and differing growth experience. In the absence of more focused policy 
commitments, there are risks that real growth benefits may be very unevenly distributed 
across the region, both at the international and sub-national level. Other salient issues 
that emerge in this analysis include: 
•  Trade within the Asian region is far from reaching its potential, and policies that 
facilitate integration and more efficient regional trade can accelerate growth and 
expand its basis, especially for lower income Asia. 
•  Tariff barriers are only part of the challenge to further economic integration and 
trade expansion in the region. If trade within the Asian region can be made more 
efficient, even by small but continuing improvements in reducing distribution 
costs, the gains would be much greater than those resulting from tariff or other 
trade policy reform. A deeper and more inclusive Asian Free Trade Area can 
achieve for its members larger benefits than that would arise from global trade 
liberalization along World Trade Organization (WTO) lines. 
•  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies have the most 
to gain (in domestic terms) from Asian economic integration, provided that this 
happens in a relatively uniform way. This is because ASEAN will emerge as a 
growth bridge between the larger dynamic emerging economies of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and India. 
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•  There will be a shift of emphasis across the region from export competition to 
competition for imports. As absorption by the larger and more dynamic regional 
economies increases, this presents new export opportunities, yet the same 
absorption includes raw materials needed for higher value-added production in 
other economies. 
More empirical research of this kind can help policy makers better identify both the 
opportunities and challenges ahead. This ability to evaluate policy impacts ex ante will 
help them recruit beneficiaries in support of their policies and anticipate the adjustment 
needs of those who might be adversely affected. 
2 Background 
Regional events of the last two decades have fundamentally changed the economic 
landscape of Asia and its relationship to the global economy. PRC has moved from a 
command and control economy to a model of global resource allocation based on 
comparative advantage. In the process, PRC’s export competitiveness has provided new 
standards for efficient international division of labour. At the same time, sustained 
growth by this economy has also shifted attention from its export competitiveness to the 
new basis for Asian regional growth, internal demand. Over the last decade, PRC’s 
absorption has become one of the primary drivers of regional growth and development. 
The recent acceleration India’s growth process, with attendant economic reforms, now 
promises to propagate rapid growth across the Asian region. As these two large 
economies proceed in tandem, they will confer growth leverage on their neighbours, 
directly via bilateral trade and indirectly across a web of supply chain linkages between 
their two economies and elsewhere across the region and beyond. Southeast Asia is 
especially well situated to benefit from the parallel expansion of India and PRC. 
Because of geography and established comparative advantages in resources, commercial 
facilitation, and intermediate production, ASEAN economies will emerge as a ‘growth 
bridge’ between the dynamic markets of PRC and India. In this process, growth 
externalities will be transmitted to some of the lowest income and slower growing 
ASEAN economies. Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam are all well situated to 
become pillars of the PRC-India growth bridge. This kind of recruitment into more 
dynamic growth trends will contribute significantly and positively to growth 
convergence across Asia. 
To realize the full potential of this process, policies that facilitate trade will be essential. 
Most important among these will be institutional change and public and private 
commitments to infrastructure. Institutional approaches to trade facilitation include both 
traditional trade reform and more determined efforts at economic integration. The Asian 
policy environment has historically relied on informal and non-binding agreements to 
promote regional commerce, but more recent initiatives are striving for greater 
exactitude, coherence and transparency. In the areas of regulation, legal conventions, 
and technical standards, movement to greater formality and uniformity can do much to 
facilitate private agency, trade, and growth. Indeed, an Asian counterpart of the OECD 
might do much to consolidate the basis for integration and growth. This model is very 
different from a more disciplined economic union like the EU, striving for the benefits 
of standards without deeper policy coordination.    3
For commitments to infrastructure, the public sector can take leadership directly (both 
domestically and multilaterally) and indirectly by promoting the climate for long term 
private capital commitments. Success in this area is an essential precondition for 
economic participation and growth, because infrastructure makes a fundamental 
contribution to both. By extending the horizon of profitable private investment wherever 
it is established, infrastructure multiplies growth benefits and strengthens the capacity of 
markets to allocate resources and opportunities. This in turn recruits new human and 
other resources to the growth process, extending a virtuous growth cycle around the 
region. 
The next century begins with very different initial conditions for Asia. As political 
systems have become less polarized and inward-looking, economic systems have also 
evolved from head-to-head export competition to greater integration. In the process, 
regional ideology and rivalry have given way to new pragmatism and recognition of 
opportunities for mutual prosperity. Uncertainties and cycles will remain inevitable, but 
the region has now demonstrated its residence against external and internal shocks. In 
addition to greater institutional coherence, two economic trends will help Asia secure 
the basis for growth. The first is a more diversified and collaborative foundation for 
future growth, based on more intensive regional trade linkages. Second, internal growth 
and the emergence of consumer majorities in these economies will mean that more and 
more growth will be internally generated, both inside Asian economies and within the 
Asian region. If these trends can be supported and extended, sustainable progress 
toward greater and uniform prosperity in the region can be realized. 
As Figure 1 indicates, Asian economies direct a far greater share of their demand than 
supply to the region. The gap between these two graphs represents the structural trade 
surplus that has persisted between Asia and the Western OECD. While burgeoning 
exports have an important source of external income for Asia, there are continuing and 
recently escalating concerns about whether these imbalances are sustainable. Rather 
than contemplate reducing them with by attenuating East-West trade, we advocate 
measures to more rapidly increase intra-regional trade, promoting domestic growth and 
absorption that can reduce dependence on traditional export markets, and their attendant 
relative imbalances, in ways that increase the volume of trade and achieve 
diversification for more sustainable progress and global economic security.  
To better understand Asian regional trade and how it can contribute to progress, 
consider a schematic regional scheme as shown in Figure 2. Here we categorize the 
selected Asian Development Bank (ADB) developing member countries and Japan into 
three generic regions, East, Southeast, and South Asia. Our GTAP database actually 
details all the Asian countries listed in this diagram, but for the sake of general 
discussion this regionalization is convenient. While this simplification glosses over 
many differences between economies within the three, as well as similarities between 
economies across them, it has a strong geographical basis in history.  
From this perspective, Figure 3 decomposes total Asian trade (100 per cent) into 
bilateral flows between each of the three regions and with respect to the aggregate Rest 
of the World (RoW) residual. While this diagram is rather detailed, two facts emerge 
immediately. First, Asia remains heavily reliant on external sources of demand for its 
export supplies. Since exports have been a decisive catalyst for Asian dynamism, this 
fact is especially significant from a growth perspective. Conversely, and just as   4
importantly, intra-Asian patterns of absorption indicate that Asia is far from its potential 
to stimulate and sustain regional growth. 
What we see most definitively in this figure is the Asian legacy of third-market export 
competition. Over the last two generations, most resources for Asian export 
development have been targeted at affluent Western OECD markets, inducing head-to-
head competition and limiting reliance on regional demand as a growth source. This was 
partly an artifact of earlier trade regimes, and partly an inevitable consequence of 
relative incomes. The political and economic fundamentals of the Asian region have 
changed dramatically, however, and it is time for trade patterns to adjust to this reality.  
Rapidly rising incomes in all three regions will create new absorption and markets for 
both domestic and foreign suppliers, and responses by the latter can sharply increase the 
minute bilateral trade shares observed in 2001. Demand alone will not be enough to 
accomplish this, however. Institutional changes that can overcome ‘soft’ trade barriers, 
including protectionism, administrative inefficiency, and political dissonance, are 
already progressing rapidly. The final barrier, explaining the small bilateral shares and 
threatening to keep them small, is distribution margins. As already emphasized, 
determined public and private commitments will be needed to reduce these to levels that 
make intra-Asian trade as efficient and profitable as its (e.g.) trans-Pacific counterpart. 
Before moving on the policy analysis, it is worth reviewing a little more about the 
fundamentals of Asian regional development. As Figure 4 indicates, the three regions in 
question are quite diverse. East Asia currently leads in total economic activity by a 
margin of more than two-to-one. The importance of trade to the region has already been 
mentioned, so we know it is no coincidence that regional trade shares show a close 
relationship to GDP shares. The only significant difference here is for Southeast Asia, 
which is even more trade dependent in GDP terms than East Asia and much more so 
than South Asia. This fact should be recalled below when the results for regional 
integration show dramatic gains for ASEAN.  
The population figures are well known and widely understood, but comparing them to 
the GDP shares emphasized the initial differences in relatively living standards across 
Asia. Generally speaking, Southeast Asia is intermediate in terms of average per capita 
income, South Asia relatively low, and East Asia relatively high. Of course the East 
Asian results are biased somewhat by very high income economies, yet the proximity of 
these to PRC will be a persistent source of growth leverage to the entire East Asian 
population. Once again, only greater regional integration can transmit such Keynesian 
benefits more widely. 
3  Baseline and policy scenarios 
3.1  A baseline scenario to 2025 
The starting point for this Asian regional trade analysis is a global trade database for 
2001, which we extrapolate forward to 2025 with the Structural ADB General 
Equilibrium (SAGE) Model, a dynamic CGE forecasting facility calibrated to the   5
GTAP  VI global trade database.2 The extrapolation is carried out as a dynamic 
calibration to Baseline aggregate growth forecasting obtained from growth accounting 
calculations. The calibrated Baseline then serves as a reference point to evaluate policy 
scenarios and other counterfactual events, but it is also of independent interest as an 
indicator of changing long term economic conditions. In this section we review some of 
the economic fundamentals from the Baseline projection and compare them to scenarios 
for alternative trade regimes and changing conditions for regional trade and transport. 
Figure 5 presents the average forecasted growth rates for Asian economies over the 
period in question, to primary calibration variable for our Baseline. In this figure, we 
use a ‘league table’ layout to highlight the ranking of per capita GDP growth rates and 
the effect of population growth on per capita real incomes. Note that we do not take 
account here of purchasing power parity or shifts in nominal exchange rates, so these 
results are subject to some qualification. In our Baseline the main characteristics of 
Asian growth are expected to persist in a relatively stable regional and global policy 
environment. We also must assume no exogenous shocks (SARs, tsunami, avian flu, 
etc.) are of sufficient magnitude to derail Baseline growth more than temporarily.  
Having made these caveats, we see that PRC is expected to continue providing growth 
leadership in the region, followed by smaller economies, whose aggregate growth and 
real living standards will be linked by population growth. Bangladesh, Philippines, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, India, and other places will all experience significant per capita 
income discounts because of high population growth, while Europe and Japan will 
actually experience higher per capita income because of shrinking populations. Rapid 
productivity improvement and capital accumulation will be the key driving forces of 
future Asian growth (Table 1). 
While GDP trends over the Baseline are calibrated from independent forecasting, 
structural adjustments within the regional economies are projected endogenously. One 
important example of this is trade patterns, which respond to aggregate individual 
growth in the SAGE model with complex shifts based of price-directed resource 
allocation. Table 2 describes how these patterns would change by 2025 under the 
Baseline scenario, in terms of percentage changes in real trade flows and percentage 
change in shares of total Asian trade. For convenience, the same results are presented 
schematically in Figure 6. Figure 6 indicates that Asian trade increases in every 
direction over the period 2005-25, by at least 110 per cent and as much as 300 per cent. 
While aggregate trade is generally growing, however, its composition shifts. In 
particular, there is generally an increase in the share of intra-Asian trade and a decline in 
the per cent of Asia’s trade with the RoW. By comparison, there is moderate 
improvement in the weak bilateral linkages described in Figure 3.  
The Baseline is of course a status quo or ‘Business as Usual (BaU)’ scenario where the 
policy regime is unchanged and no external shocks occur. Under these conditions, 
smooth aggregate growth and moderate structural change are to be expected, yet 
modern history of the Asian region has been much more dynamic. The difference has 
been due to a combination of public and private agency, with the former providing 
reformist guidance and the latter responding quickly to changing opportunities and 
challenges. To capture these events in a forecasting framework, we must specify the 
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policy or other exogenous changes we are interested in analyzing and simulation how 
private actors will respond according to the economic theory embodied in the SAGE 
model.  
3.2  Alternation integration scenarios 
To appraise Asia’s prospects for improved growth through regional integration, we have 
implemented the model with respect to a series of alternative trade scenarios, including 
global trade liberalization, Asian regional liberalization, and contrasted these under 
varying regional conditions of further economic integration. In this section we present 
the results of these preliminary scenarios, intended to bracket the aggregate growth 
possibilities for the region and give an indication about the potential for deeper regional 
integration to accelerate growth and promote convergence toward higher living 
standards across Asia. 
Table 3 summarizes the scenarios, where trade liberalization refers to removal of all 
tariff and tariff equivalent import and export barriers in the GTAP VI database. In 
addition to reforming trade distorting policies, we also examine the implications of 
increased trade efficiency, as this might arise from institutional reforms and/or public 
and private investments in distribution and communication infrastructure. To capture 
this in a general way, we make use of the so-called ‘iceberg’ specification of trade to 
represent trade efficiency. This acts as a proxy for measures that would facilitate 
regional integration. Formally, trade, transport, and transit costs are interpreted in 
commodity content terms, discounting deliverable quantity in terms of real or virtual 
perishability during transit. In other words, there is a scalar relationship between the 
world price of an export and its corresponding import price that takes the form: 







where  W denotes the world price system, i and j are trading partners, and k is the 
tradeable commodity or service in question. 
When seen from this very general perspective, it is convenient to think of the iceberg 
parameter λ as a transactions cost without offsetting income to any service provider. 
From the exporter perspective, this corresponds to a discount 1/λ and from the importer 
a premium (λ-1), respectively. These distortions are the ultimate targets of investments 
designed to improve trade efficiency, and we examine the effects of reducing them in a 
series of dynamic simulations. 
It is worth emphasizing that trade costs over and above any administrative agency are 
generally very large in the global economy. These costs mainly arise from 
transportation, distribution, and border-related barriers such as information, language, 
currency conversion, etc. Some empirical studies based gravity models have concluded 
that the tax equivalent of international trade barriers are in the range of 40 per cent to 80 
per cent, substantially larger than global average tariff levels (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2004).   7
Tables 4-6 and Figures 7-9 present the major aggregate simulation results at the national 
level. Two salient features are worthy of emphasis here. First, when trading efficiency 
can be improved in the Asian region, internal trade emerges to play a dominant role in 
long term GDP growth. By comparison to universal tariff abolition, either regionally or 
globally (ATL and GBL), an Asian Free Trade Area (FTA) with moderate trade 
facilitation (ATL2) would achieve much greater gains for most of its members. 
Moreover, every country would be better off pursuing Asian free trade and trade 
facilitation than waiting for a global regime of free trade, even if this were to occur over 
the same time horizon.  
The key to real income gains from this approach is a combination of export expansion 
and improving terms of trade (Figure 9) that are facilitated by lower regional 
distribution margins. Terms of trade improve because of the classical double-edged 
benefit of reducing distribution margins: higher producer prices and lower purchaser 
prices. These results clearly suggest the effectiveness of Asian regional trade 
intensification as a hedging strategy against lack of WTO progress. 
Second, it is apparent from these results that the ASEAN economies have the most to 
gain from Asian economic integration, provided that regional liberalization proceeds in 
a relatively uniform way. Comparing the ATL scenario to GBL, it appears that most 
ASEAN economies would be worse off under global free trade than that under Asian 
free trade, reflecting possible trade diversion toward ASEAN following the formation of 
Asian free trade bloc. This highlights the importance of intra-Asia trade to Southeast 
Asian countries. For PRC, Korea and South Asia, globalism would be significantly 
better than an Asian trade liberalization alone because these are economies with above 
average prior levels of extra-regional trade dependence. Among all Asian countries, 
Hong Kong and ASEAN have the most to gain from an ATL arrangement, especially 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
To get a better sense of the relative contributions of different policy regimes to national 
income, consider the real income effects by regional grouping, beginning with East 
Asia. Here there are two distinct types of economies, those with large stakes in markets 
outside Asia, facing and/or presenting high protection levels. These three, PRC, Japan, 
and Korea, would gain relatively less, but still significantly from ATL arrangements, 
particularly with trade facilitation. The second group consists of economies more 
dependent on intra-Asian trade, with low initial trade shares, or facing and/or presenting 
low prior protection levels. These economies, Hong Kong, China, and Taipei, China, 
both have much more to gain from trade facilitation than from regional tariff reductions, 
so they have a greater stake in reducing structural trade barriers in their own region.  
The case of Southeast Asia is more like the second category of East Asian economies, 
but the growth effects can be much more dramatic. In all the ASEAN cases considered, 
much greater income gains are obtained by regional trade facilitation than by tariff 
removal, whether the trade liberalization is regional or global. Incidentally, this fact 
should not be interpreted as a license to promote margin reduction instead of tariff 
reform. For the region, the gains of removing structural barriers to trade can only be 
fully realized in a liberal trade environment. In any case, ASEAN achieves very 
substantial growth dividends from trade both types of trade facilitation (tariff removal 
and increased trade efficiency), with 2025 real income increases of between 33 and 116 
per cent. Removal of structural barriers by achieving greater trade efficiency appears to 
offer the vast majority of this growth potential, again pointing to the importance of   8
regional trade facilitation and integration as a means to accelerate, broaden, and sustain 
Asia’s growth. This consideration will become particularly significant as other OECD 
economies continue to mature and their growth trajectories flatten.  
Note also the indirect growth dividends that arise from regional linkages, particularly to 
the more dynamic Asian economies. Such linkages are only discernable with detailed 
bilateral and sectoral analysis, but intuition makes it plain that, with ATL, the higher 
growth regions will confer more demand stimulus on their neighbours. Most advantaged 
in this context are the geocentric regional economies, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. For all these countries, the combination of regional trade facilitation by 
tariff removal and improved efficiency far outweighs the gains from global free trade. 
The case of South Asia is more mixed, mainly because of higher prior protection levels 
(presented and faced) and greater economic isolation from East and Southeast Asia. The 
degree of economic isolation is measured in the model by trade shares. Since South 
Asia has much greater dependence on extra-Asian markets, global tariff reductions will 
confer a larger benefit on them in relative terms. Despite these facts, ATL tariff reform 
and 3 per cent annual reduction in average regional trade costs provide much larger real 
income benefits to all the three South Asian economies considered. Percentage real 
income gains are generally smaller than for Southeast or East Asia, but this again is 
consistent with the low Asian trade shares for South Asian economies. As we shall see 
next, however, trade shares increase dramatically within the region under these 
scenarios, particularly ATL2. The role of ASEAN here is central, and greater policy 
attention to its bridging role from East to South Asia is needed if regional benefits are to 
spread more effectively. 
3.3  Regional and sub-regional growth poles 
Which economies will provide the most internal dynamism as the Asian region 
integrates. The PRC is unusual in being a large and very fast growing economy, yet 
growth rates projected to be relatively high in many regional economies. Ultimately, 
growth linkage will depend on detailed expenditure and supply chains within sectors 
and across webs of multinational commercial networks. Still, it is useful to examine the 
main sources of regional and sub-regional growth from demand side. In terms of import 
absorption, Figure 10 describes regional and national import demand composition, all in 
shares of total Asian imports. It is clear from this evidence that PRC’s absorption will 
be a primary regional growth driver. Subregionally, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand 
will share leadership as growth poles, while India will be the dominant source of import 
demand in the South Asian sub-region. 
To summarize the results thus far, a few observations are in order: 
•  Long run growth prospects for the Asian region remain quite positive, and trade 
can play a central role.  
•  Combining an Asian Free Trade Agreement with modest but sustained 
improvements in regional trade efficiency realizes substantial positive real 
income growth for every Asian economy.   9
•  As a corollary, it needs to be more generally recognized around the region that 
structural and institutional commitments to regional trade efficiency are much 
more important than simple tariff reductions. 
•  Southeast Asia is the biggest percentage winner from the ATL2 scenario, which 
combines regional liberalization with trade facilitation. 
•  Between the large dynamic economies of PRC and India, the role of ASEAN is 
central for two reasons: 
o  Because of geographic factors, it can act as a ‘growth bridge’ between 
South and East Asia, increasing regional trade and value added capture. 
o  ASEAN includes some of the lowest income economies, and these are 
among the best situated for infrastructure to promote regional integration. 
Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam could all be ‘pillars’ of the Asian 
growth bridge. 
4  An agenda for Asian regional integration 
We have already seen that regional integration can be a potent aggregate growth 
stimulus for Asia. Although country-specific outcomes vary, combined regional tariff 
reductions and extensive improvements in trade efficiency can achieve substantial 
improvements in real incomes. Moreover, this trade and income growth represent 
diversification and new market development that can promote wider regional benefits 
and greater sustainability. Despite these obvious advantages, however, the classical 
theory of customs unions tells us that the expansionary benefits of regionalism can be at 
least partially offset by diversion of trade from existing partners and markets. We have 
seen (Figure 7) that (e.g.) the Baseline scenario calls for increased trade between all 
regions. Now we need to examine Asian regionalism more closely to see how it might 
shift trade patterns away from established markets/relationships and possibly limit the 
potential gains from institutional and real investments in trade facilitation. 
Before proceeding with detailed inspection of Asian regional trade patterns, we want to 
review conceptual principles of international trade and regionalism. Until relatively 
recently, dynamic Asian development has been driven mainly by demand outside the 
region. This orientation was a product of colonial history and traditional thinking about 
comparative advantage, where international trade is supposed to be driven primarily by 
structural differences between countries, leading to patterns of specialization that even 
reinforced these differences. According to these received ideas, North-South trade was 
driven by, and indeed could be expected to reinforce, Northern comparative advantage 
in capital and skill intensive products while the South specialized in primary resource 
and unskilled labour intensive exports. This trend had obvious implications for global 
income distribution, since value added was much higher in the former activities than in 
the latter, and world trade was long dominated by these two directions of trade (as 
opposed to South-South or North-North) which further reinforced global economic 
divergence.  
The advent of increased North-North trade in the post-War era began to change 
economists understanding about the underlying drivers of trade, however. Increasingly, 
world trade began to be dominated by exchange among modern high income economies 
with more national commonality than differentiation. As an obvious symptom of this,   10
two-way trade (imports and exports in the same product categories) became the fastest 
growing category of trade. With increased European integration in particular, it became 
apparent that, as economies advance and diversify internally, trade is increasingly 
driven by shared characteristics. Table 7 makes this trend clear, indicating that since 
1948, a majority of world trade has been between similar country categories rather than 
along more traditional Ricardian lines of comparative advantage based on large scale 
national differentiation. 
Three of the similarity-based drivers of international trade are of special significance: 
(1) economies of scale; (2) multinational marketing; (3) supply chains and production 
networks. In today’s global economy, the main impetus for modern integration is to 
expand commercial networks and capture value added through domestic and 
international diversification. This is well established in western markets, between Japan 
and its advanced trading partners, and is now becoming a robust and pervasive feature 
of Asian trade. Moreover, Asia presents a special attraction for these strategies because 
of its superior domestic growth rates and low initial trade shares. Taken together, these 
two characteristics promise the kind of superior returns already identified in emerging 
market investment patterns. For the same reason, private stakeholders have already 
recognized this shift in Asian trade fundamentals. To serve both public and private long 
term interests in this context then, a new generation of policies is needed to facilitate 
growth-oriented Asian economic integration. 
Before discussing policy fundamentals, however, we want to review evidence from the 
SAGE model about how trade reform and structural trade facilitation can contribute to 
more extensive and intensive regional trade ties. We do this by decomposing the 
bilateral sub-regional trade links under our three counterfactual scenarios. 
Because of its country disaggregation, SAGE allows use to examine the evolution of 
regional trade patterns in considerable detail. Table 8 presents the bilateral trade results 
for the Baseline (restated from Table 2) and our three core scenarios, with schematic 
presentations in the companion Figures 11 and 12. These results, representing 
percentage changes in bilateral flows as well as bilateral shares of total Asian trade, bear 
out two essential features of Asian progress toward regionalism. First, trade growth and 
diversification are compatible for Asia. In all three scenarios, Asian bilateral trade 
expands in all directions with a single exception. Apart from South Asian trade in the 
ATL2 case, every Asian increases trade in both directions with every other region, 
including RoW, in every scenario.3 This means that Asian regionalism need not be seen 
as incompatible with globalization generally or with established extra-regional trade ties 
in particular. 
Even more arresting than the monotonicity of bilateral trade growth are the magnitudes, 
particularly in the regional scenario. Recalling the original discussion in Section 2 about 
regional trade potential, it is encouraging to see modest but sustained gains in trade 
efficiency translated into 3-10 fold increases in bilateral flows. Global trade reform will 
also contribute to Asian trade intensification, less within the region but more growth 
with respect to RoW (as would be expected). The main difference here is the 
institutional requirements to achieve conclusive progress of the WTO agenda. The 
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uncertainties in this area are very widely perceived, and a plethora of bilateral and 
regional agreements have already advanced in part to hedge against these risks. 
Regardless of WTO uncertainties, however, the logic is clear for Asia to establish its 
own agenda for trade and economic growth. If greater trade can be facilitated by tariff 
reform and structural measures, the gains would be very substantial. Moreover, there is 
no evidence that these would impede the progress of WTO, and might in many ways 
provide a competitive discipline to expedite it. 
Seen from the perspective of trade shares, the integration scenario begins to look more 
like the classical theory of customs unions. Clearly, preferential trade liberalization will 
shift the growth of trade into the Asian region, but this is of course a direct objective of 
trade diversification. For this reason, trade shares rise for all intra-Asian bilateral links, 
and very significantly, while shares for trade with RoW fall. It must be emphasized that 
this is not classical trade diversion, however, but growth diversion. Recall that Asian 
trade with RoW increases in all scenarios, so trade will continue to support growth in all 
directions emanating from the Asian economies, including their traditional non-Asian 
trade partners. The ATL2 arrangement merely accelerates growth and confers an 
increasing share of the benefits of this on those who created it, the Asian economies. 
Clearly the potential of regional trade can be realized if sustained growth guarantees the 
growth of Asian demand. What is needed is an enabling environment for Asian trade to 
be diversified away from traditional North-South patterns of comparative advantage and 
specialization. A new generation of integration policies and perhaps even new 
institutions can accomplish this, but our results indicate that the economic potential is 
considerable. 
5  Policies that facilitate integration 
Given the apparent benefits of Asian economic integration, it is reasonable to ask what 
kinds of policies are most likely to support this process. From an overall perspective, the 
institutional environment is the first consideration. In this context, we want to 
distinguish between two categories of institutional arrangements for economic 
integration. The first of these we call the policy coherence  approach to economic 
integration, as exemplified by OECD style institutions and initiatives. The second 
category is the more rigorous (monetary, fiscal, etc.) policy harmonization approach to 
integration, represented by EU type arrangements. Structural coherence and 
harmonization are not incompatible, but the former is much less binding on domestic 
policy institutions and constituencies. The kind of scenarios we have been evaluating, 
and their benefits, can be achieved mainly by policy coherence. 
In particular, to lay the groundwork for propagating commercial linkages around the 
region, transferring momentum from Asia’s rapid growth economies to its neighbours, 
coherent administrative, regulatory, and technical standards will be essential. To the 
extent that an ‘Asian OECD’ could originate and sustain this kind of ‘soft 
infrastructure’, it would be very desirable. In addition to traditional forms of public 
sector leadership, a more explicit regional commitment to increased trading efficiency 
would help recruit private agency to the regional integration agenda.  
Apart from institutional development, there are four main areas where policy initiative 
can make a difference in facilitating Asian regional integration:   12
•  Cooperative infrastructure development 
•  Regional capital market coherence 
•  Trade negotiation and facilitation 
•  Labour productivity growth 
We review each of these in turn, with emphasis on how they can support the kind of 
outcomes analysed in the regional scenario above. 
5.1 Infrastructure  investment 
Public and private commitments to infrastructure have been an essential guarantor of 
national development in the dynamic Asian economies, and they will likewise be 
essential to extending this dynamism across the region. The long term returns to this 
kind of investment are well understood. Infrastructure lowers distribution margins, 
simultaneously raising producer prices and lower purchaser prices. This virtuous 
combination extends the profitably horizon of economic participation wherever 
infrastructure reaches (and often well beyond), generating multiplier effects too 
complex and extensive for even the most determined project accountant to measure.  
The challenge for infrastructure is not arguing its long term virtues, but facilitating 
capital market’s abilities to capture and price the real returns on this kind of investment. 
Heterogeneous regulatory systems, often lacking transparency or adequate legal 
support, make it nearly impossible to compute such rates of return, let alone their risk 
adjusted counterparts. If Asian governments want to enlist private agency in a regional 
agenda for this kind of investment, so essential to effective integration, more determined 
efforts at policy coherence will certainly be needed.  
Is it worth the effort? There are two arguments in favour of this, the first being the 
regional rewards to integration estimated in this study. The second argument is one of 
fiscal effectiveness. All but the highest income Asian economies have important 
constraints on their public spending, and for this reason projects with a positive social 
return must often be deferred. This is particularly unfortunate, since private capital can 
now be seen as the largest source of regional development finance. 
It is well known that Asian economic growth has benefited greatly from external 
savings, in the form of both public and private foreign capital inflows. In some Asian 
countries, aid has played a major role historically, but today private foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is a dramatically emergent phenomenon. While FDI is a private sector 
activity, and thus is animated by very different primary objectives than aid flows, it has 
been known to confer many benefits on developing economies that are consistent with 
aid objectives, including human resource development, technology diffusion, and, 
ultimately, rising living standards and more sustainable growth. In this sense, it has long 
been recognized that there may be essential complementarities between private and 
public foreign investment in developing countries, where the latter means aid. 
The extent to which the complementarities matter is not intellectual, but dependent upon 
their real and potential economic significance. To get an idea of this, look at the trends 
presented in Figure 13. These depict, for Asian countries, levels of overseas 
development assistance (ODA) and inbound FDI for the period 1973-2003, normalized 
from constant US dollars to unity in 1973. The most striking feature of this data is of   13
course the meteoric rise in inbound FDI, which has increased almost exactly one 
hundredfold over the last three decades. This trend must inspire reflection on the 
appropriate strategy to promote private investment, across the region. Clearly, public 
and private investment commitments must be complementary, particularly if the former 
is to be effective. 
5.2  Regional capital markets 
In addition to the specific category of infrastructure, productive investments of all kinds 
need to be facilitated as part of a regional integration agenda. Along with export 
demand, private capital formation has been an essential growth agent in Asia. As was 
already emphasized, modern regionalism is based on market scope and supply chain 
linkages that imply very difference investment patterns from trade based on national 
specialization. To facilitate movement of firms and commercial networks around the 
region, their enterprise capital account transactions must also be facilitated. Again this 
requires coherence in terms of standards, from accounting to securities regulation, so 
that both sourcing and placement of capital can happen more extensively and 
intensively across the region. 
FDI is now an essential feature of regionalism and a forceful integration mechanism. 
Moreover, international investment flows have helped many emerging economies 
overcome savings constraints to stimulate and sustain development. For this reason, FDI 
can make important contributions to convergence if local market conditions can be 
made more hospitable. The essential requirements are again transparency and 
coherence, including any policies that limit distortions to real rates of return on local 
investment.  
5.3  Trade policy and regional integration 
Bilateral and multilateral trade facilitation are of course essential to achieve regional 
integration and realize its growth potential. Geographically, Asia has an advantage in 
terms of continuous proximity, but administrative barriers to trade can often be more 
significant than geography. The vast international rent-seeking network that evolved in 
response to MFA import quotas stands as a dramatic historical example of how trade 
policies can defy geographic or Ricardian logic. For this reason, capacity and 
commitment to more liberal trade relations is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition to 
realize the gains from Asian regional integration that we have estimated. 
Besides the on-going efforts on multilateral trade negotiations under WTO Doha 
agenda, Asian countries have pursued bilateral or regional free trade agreements (FTAs) 
to best secure the benefits of economic integration. A number of FTAs have been signed 
or are under negotiation in East and South Asia, such as the ASEAN FTA, the ASEAN 
and PRC FTA, and the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) FTA. Each of these will 
have its particular challenges and opportunities, and some represent steps toward others. 
For the present, however, we confined ourselves to a more inclusive reference case for 
Asian integration because we believe it makes the strongest case for further 
commitments in this direction.   14
5.4  Policies to promote labour productivity growth 
In a world of capital mobility, the only long term justification for higher real wages is 
higher labour productivity. Judging from their modern policies, it is clear that many 
Asian countries are well aware of this fact. Initial conditions now vary widely across the 
region, however, and regional integration will only propagate its gains equitably if it is 
accompanied by rising labour productivity. The alternative will be something like a 
regional version of the traditional North-South patterns alluded to earlier, with excessive 
specialization and divergence in average living standards. 
To more fully realize the vast human potential of this region, for domestic income 
growth arising from both wages and investments at home and elsewhere, a more 
coherent approach to fostering labour productivity growth would be valuable. For all 
countries in the region, this is the most important long term commitment to sustained 
and equitable growth, but it remains beyond the fiscal reach of many. To advance this 
regional agenda, private capital can do more of the work in an enabling investment 
climate. Employment based education and skills development could be a direct result of 
greater inbound FDI, in turn a result of expanded trade, if commitments to integration 
are determined enough.4 
6 Conclusions 
Economic dynamism is well established in Asia and continues to spread, yet regional 
growth rates and living standards remain uneven and many areas have yet to enjoy 
significant benefits. Historically, this process has relied heavily on demand outside the 
region, from the early days of global exploration down to the modern North-South 
orientation of trade with western OECD economies. The research reported here looks to 
the future of the region, projecting long term trade and growth scenarios for Asia over 
the next decade using a global forecasting model. Our results clearly indicate that 
regional integration is the way forward for rapid and sustainable growth in Asia. By 
diversifying its traditional trade patterns toward emergent demand within the region, the 
Asian economies can leverage superior domestic growth rates, accelerate economic 
diversification, and broaden the basis for regional development. Integration will not 
only secure a more reliable basis for established growth patterns; it will also confer 
substantial growth leverage on many of the region’s poorest economies. In this way, 
historic growth can be sustained while greater convergence is achieved in the region  
More specifically, our work compares the potential regional growth effects of 
alternative regional trade scenarios. Contrasting progress toward WTO style global 
trade liberalization with more focused Asian regionalism, we find that most of the gains 
from the former can be achieved for Asia by a regional FTA arrangement. Moreover, 
we find that modest progress toward improving regional trade efficiency would have a 
much greater impact on Asian growth than either global or regional tariff removal alone. 
Indeed, one important conclusion of this work is that structural barriers to trade are a 
much greater constraint on growth than residual protection alone. This finding reaffirms 
                                                 
4  Compare to Collado et al. (1995) for employment outcomes.   15
the importance of policies to reduce regional trade margins, including administrative 
reforms, standards promotion, and public and private infrastructure commitments.  
The same family of policies is of course central to any agenda for regional economic 
integration. It should be emphasized, however, that our results show the benefits of 
structural policies, those governing hard infrastructure (trade, transport, transit, and 
telecoms) as well as soft infrastructure (standards, administrative efficiency and 
transparency, etc.). These characteristics represent a policy coherence approach to 
economic integration, broadly similar to OECD initiatives. This can be contrasted with 
the more rigorous (monetary, fiscal, etc.) policy harmonization approach to integration 
represented by EU type arrangements. Structural coherence and harmonization are not 
incompatible, but the former is much less binding on domestic policy institutions and 
constituencies. The right model of Asia will evolve over time, but our results indicate 
that the gains from the structural coherence approach to integration could be very 
substantial. 
In this paper, we sketched out some of the overall characteristics of more integrated 
regional growth, including general indications about policy initiatives that will be 
needed to facilitate this. Building the institutional basis for regional integration is the 
work of governments, however, not economists. An Asian OECD would provide a 
convenient venue for this work, but the initiative must be animated by a clear 
understanding of the potential benefits. Our results indicate that regional integration has 
more to offer Asia than the WTO itself, although the two should not be seen as 
substitutes.  
Whichever path Asia chooses, rich opportunities are there for stimulating growth 
through trade diversification. Our results indicate that the volume of trade with 
traditional partners can continue to grow, but that superior growth in Asia can sustain 
and indeed be sustained by policies that promote faster trade growth within the region. 
As the region transits from historical patterns of North-South specialization to a family 
of more modern, diversified, and integrated consumer societies, the vestiges of head-to-
head export competition will give way to a more collaborative basis for growth. This 
approach represents the best strategy to fulfil the immense economic promise of Asia 
for all of its people, over half of humanity.   16
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Annex - Overview of the SAGE model and data 
Model specification 
The complexities of today’s global economy make it very unlikely that policy makers 
relying on intuition or rules-of-thumb will achieve anything approaching optimality in 
either the domestic or international arenas. Market interactions are so pervasive in 
determining economic outcomes that more sophisticated empirical research tools are 
needed to improve visibility for both public and private sector decision makers. The 
preferred tool for detailed empirical analysis of economic policy is now the Calibrated 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model. It is well suited to trade analysis because it can 
detail structural adjustments within national economies and elucidate their interactions 
in international markets. The model is more extensively discussed in an annex below 
and the underlying methodology is fully documented elsewhere, but a few general 
comments will facilitate discussion and interpretation of the scenario results that follow.  
Technically, a CGE model is a system of simultaneous equations that simulate price 
directed interactions between firms and households in commodity and factor markets. 
The role of government, capital markets, and other trading partners are also specified, 
with varying degrees of detail and passivity, to close the model and account for 
economywide resource allocation, production, and income determination. 
The role of markets is to mediate exchange, usually with a flexible system of prices, the 
most important endogenous variables in a typical CGE model. As in a real market 
economy, commodity and factor price changes induce changes in the level and 
composition of supply and demand, production and income, and the remaining 
endogenous variables in the system. In CGE models, an equation system is solved for 
prices that correspond to equilibrium in markets and satisfy the accounting identities 
governing economic behaviour. If such a system is precisely specified, equilibrium 
always exists and such a consistent model can be calibrated to a base period data set. 
The resulting calibrated general equilibrium model is then used to simulate the 
economywide (and regional) effects of alternative policies or external events. 
The distinguishing feature of a general equilibrium model, applied or theoretical, is its 
closed form specification of all activities in the economic system under study. This can 
be contrasted with more traditional partial equilibrium analysis, where linkages to other 
domestic markets and agents are deliberately excluded from consideration. A large and 
growing body of evidence suggests that indirect effects (e.g., upstream and downstream 
production linkages) arising from policy changes are not only substantial, but may in 
some cases even outweigh direct effects. Only a model that consistently specifies 
economywide interactions can fully assess the implications of economic policies or 
business strategies. In a multi country model like the one used in this study, indirect 
effects include the trade linkages between countries and regions which themselves can 
have policy implications. 
The Structural ADB General Equilibrium (SAGE) model is a version of the 
LINKAGE 5 model developed at the World Bank by Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, 
implemented in the GAMS programming language, and calibrated to the GTAP   18
(version 6) global database.5 The result is a sixteen-country/region, twelve-sector global 
CGE model, calibrated over a twenty-four year time path from 2001 to 2025. Apart 
from its traditional neoclassical roots, an important feature of this model is product 
differentiation, where we specify that imports is differentiated by country of origin and 
exports are differentiated by country of destination (e.g., Derviş et al. 1982). This 
feature allows the model to capture the pervasive phenomenon of intra industry trade, 
where a country is both an importer and exporter of similar commodities, and avoids 
tendencies toward extreme specialization. 
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Table 1: Asia’s growth and its sources, 2005-25 (%) 
 
 2005-10  2010-15  2015-20  2020-25 
East Asia excluding Japan         
 GDP  6.7  6.0  5.5  5.3 
 Contribution  of: Labour  0.4  0.3  -0.1  -0.1 
     Capital  3.4  3.6  3.6  3.5 
     TFP  2.8  2.2  2.1  2.0 
Southeast Asia         
 GDP  6.9  6.8  6.1  5.5 
 Contribution  of: Labour  1.0  0.8  0.6  0.4 
     Capital  1.8  2.1  2.4  2.6 
     TFP  4.4  4.2  3.4  3.0 
South Asia         
 GDP  7.0  6.1  5.7  5.3 
 Contribution  of: Labour  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.7 
     Capital  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2 
     TFP  3.8  3.0  2.6  2.4 
Asia excluding Japan         
 GDP  6.8  6.2  5.6  5.3 
 Contribution  of: Labour  0.6  0.5  0.2  0.1 
     Capital  2.9  3.2  3.2  3.2 
     TFP  3.2  2.7  2.4  2.2 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Table 2: Baseline trade composition 
(per cent change from 2005-25) 
 
Regional trade flows (per cent change from 2005 in 2025) 
BAU  East Asia  SE Asia  South Asia  RoW 
East  Asia  145 159 201 118 
SE  Asia  166 151 298 115 
South  Asia 285 343 255 183 
RoW  133 146 182  74 
 
Regional Trade Shares (per cent change from 2005 in 2025) 
BAU  East Asia  SE Asia  South Asia  RoW 
East Asia  3  9  26  -8 
SE  Asia  12 5 67  -10 
South  Asia  62 86 49 19 
RoW -2  3  18   
Source: Simulations results.   20
 
Table 3: Initial simulation experiments 
 
 
Table 4: Real aggregate income 
(percentage change from baseline in 2025) 
 
   Scenario     
   1  2  3 
Region Economy  GBL  ATL ATL2 
East Asia  Japan  0.9  0.9  8.1 
 PRC  4.1  1.2  19.8 
 Korea  5.3  1.8  24.6 
 Hong  Kong,  China  4.4  2.9  53.8 
 Taipei,  China  1.4  1.9  25.9 
Southeast Asia  Indonesia  1.6  2.1  35.5 
 Malaysia  5.0  6.6  116.6 
 Philippines 1.8  1.9  33.4 
 Singapore  3.9  4.6  81.1 
 Thailand  5.0  5.3  61.6 
 Vietnam  7.2  6.5  59.1 
South Asia  Bangladesh  1.0  0.6  11.5 
 India  2.1  0.3  10.4 
 Sri  Lanka  2.4  0.6  22.4 
 
Source: Simulations results. 
0.  Baseline scenario (BaU)  
a.  including the admission of PRC in the WTO 
b.  removal of quotas on textile to the US and the EU 
1.  Global Trade Liberalization (GBL) 
a.  removal of all import tariffs and tariff-equivalent NTBs within Asia 
b.  removal of all export subsidies within Asia 
2.  Asia Trade Liberalization (ATL) 
a.  removal of all import tariffs and tariff-equivalent NTBs within Asia 
b.  removal of all export subsidies within Asia 
3.  Broad Reform - Asia Trade Liberalization with Trade Facilitation (ATL2) 
a.  AFT1 with trade facilitating policies simulated by 3 per cent annual reduction 
in intra-Asian trade costs   21
Table 5: Real exports 
(percentage change from baseline in 2025) 
 
   Scenario     
   1  2  3 
Region Economy  GBL  ATL ATL2 
East Asia  Japan  13.2  9.0  72.8 
 PRC  44.7  18.6  107.8 
 Korea  23.2  15.5  75.1 
 Hong  Kong,  China  2.5  3.7  31.2 
 Taipei,  China  9.3  7.6  55.2 
Southeast Asia  Indonesia  13.8  9.3  69.1 
 Malaysia  9.4  8.6  71.0 
 Philippines 6.0  0.9  72.6 
 Singapore  0.8  4.3  109.3 
 Thailand  24.4  18.2  104.8 
 Vietnam  56.8  46.1  136.5 
South Asia  Bangladesh  50.7  39.7  101.8 
 India  67.2  30.0  105.4 
 Sri  Lanka 14.0  7.9  40.5 
 
Source: Simulations results. 
 
Table 6: Aggregate terms of trade 
(percentage change from baseline in 2025) 
 
   Scenario     
   1  2  3 
Region Economy  GBL  ATL ATL2 
East Asia  Japan  1.3  2.7  52.9 
 PRC  -5.4  0.7  33.7 
 Korea  -0.3  -0.3  43.4 
 Hong  Kong,  China  3.9  1.8  48.8 
 Taipei,  China  1.6  2.5  45.8 
Southeast Asia  Indonesia  2.6  3.7  52.2 
 Malaysia  0.6  1.5  44.7 
 Philippines 2.8  6.2  54.8 
 Singapore  2.5  1.9  29.6 
 Thailand  1.9  3.9  43.2 
 Vietnam  -3.8  -1.5  31.3 
South Asia  Bangladesh  -2.8  -2.4  30.0 
 India  -5.2  0.4  43.9 
 Sri  Lanka  4.5  0.9  38.8 
 
Source: Simulations results.   22
Table 7: Trade by development status 
   1948  1998  2001 
Developed to developed  46  53  40 
Developed to emerging  22  18  22 
Emerging to developed  22  18  26 
Emerging to emerging  10  11  12 
 100  100  100 
 
Source: United Nations Direction of Trade Statistics, 1994. 
Table 8: Asian regional trade linkages 
Regional  trade  flows      Regional  trade  shares 
(per cent change from 2005 in 2025)      (per cent change from 2005 in 2025) 
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Asia 
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632 659 1621 91    East 
Asia 
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Asia 
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Figure 1: Demand is already leading supply regionally (intra-Asian import and export shares by 




























Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF. 
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Figure 3: Asian trade shares (trade flows as a per cent of total Asian trade, 2001) 
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Figure 5: Real GDP growth by country/region 
(baseline, annualized percentage change, 2005-25) 
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Figure 6: Baseline changes in regional trade flows 
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Figure 10: Asian import demand composition 
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Figure 11: Regional trade flow levels (percentage change from baseline 2005 in 2025)  
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Figure 13: Asian regional public and private investment: an age of complementarity  
(Asian inbound Aid and FDI, USD Billions) 
 
Source: OECD; UNCTAD. 
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